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Every day, the U.S. government spends millions of dollars protect-
ing airports, train stations and other locations from terrorist threats based
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on a small percentage chance that a terrorist might strike at that loca-
tion and on that day.1 The public seldom seriously questions the wisdom
of these investments. By contrast, despite mounting evidence of the risks
posed by climate change, the public has remained reluctant to support even
modest policies to prevent the potential risks posed by climate change.
What makes climate change different? At least part of the explanation is
that non-trivial portions of the public lack confidence in the credibility and
legitimacy of climate change science.2 Several recent surveys and opinion
polls suggest that the public’s perception of the legitimacy and credibility
of climate science has deteriorated dramatically over the past three years.3
A significant reason why the debate has become so intractable4 is the ten-
dency to view through a scientific lens the complicated political, social and
economic issues involved in climate change policy.5 This dynamic confuses
1 See John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks,
Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security 2, 13, 15 (Mar. 20, 2011) (unpublished paper pre-
pared for presentation at the panel Terror and the Economy: Which Institutions Help Miti-
gate the Damage? at the Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association,
April 1, 2011), available at http://polisci.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller/MID11TSM.PDF.
2 See, e.g., ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 2009: AN
AUDIENCE SEGMENTATION ANALYSIS 3 (2009) [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ ET AL., GLOBAL
WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 2009] (segmenting the public views on climate change as
“Alarmed” (18 percent), “Concerned” (33 percent), “Cautious” (19 percent), “Disengaged”
(12 percent), “Doubtful” (11 percent), and “Dismissive” (7 percent)); CRAIG IDSO & S. FRED
SINGER, CLIMATE CHANGE RECONSIDERED: REPORT OF THE NONGOVERNMENTAL INTER-
NATIONAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (NIPCC) (2009); GLOBAL WARMING PETITION
PROJECT, http://www.petitionproject.org (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
3 See, e.g., 69% Say It’s Likely Scientists Have Falsified Global Warming Research,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Aug. 3, 2011) http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content
/politics/current_events/environment_energy/69_say_it_s_likely_scientists_have_falsified
_global_warming_research; Anita Pugliese & Julie Ray, Fewer Americans, Europeans View
Global Warming as a Threat, GALLUP (Apr 20, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/147203
/Fewer-Americans-Europeans-View-Global-Warming-Threat.aspx (noting ten percent
declines in public concern about climate change in Western Europe and United States
from 2007 to 2008 and 2010).
4 See, e.g., Andrew Hoffman, The Growing Climate Divide, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
195, 195 (July 2011); Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, The Politicization of Climate
Change and Polarization in the American Public’s Views of Global Warming, 2001–2010, 52
SOCIOL. QUART. 155, 155 (2011); MIKE HULME, WHY WE DISAGREE ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE:
UNDERSTANDING CONTROVERSY, INACTION AND OPPORTUNITY xxiii (Cambridge 2009).
5 See, e.g., Andrew J. Hoffman, Talking Past Each Other? Cultural Framing of Skeptical and
Convinced Logics in the Climate Change Debate, 24 ORG. ENV’T 3, 4 (2011); Jeroen van der
Sluijs et al., Beyond Consensus: Reflections from a Democratic Perspective on the Interaction
Between Climate Politics and Science, 2 CURRENT OPINION IN ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 409,
409 (2010) (exploring the complex interactions between science and policy in the context
of climate change); Daniel Sarewitz, How Science Makes Environmental Controversies
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the issues, exacerbates misunderstandings, and makes them more diffi-
cult for the public to understand.6 Something must be done to restore the
public’s confidence in the credibility of climate change science. The public
discourse surrounding climate change needs to separate the science from
the rest of the debate so that the public can understand the political and
social issues better.
Climate policy is unlikely to escape its present state of paralysis
unless the credibility and legitimacy of climate science is restored.7 In ad-
dition to diminishing support for new climate policies, the crisis of confi-
dence in climate science is interfering with the efforts of federal agencies
trying to implement existing environmental regulations. For example, the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was heavily criticized—
and legally challenged—for supporting an Endangerment Finding for
Greenhouse Gases under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act.8 The public’s
concerns about the credibility of climate change science are usually associ-
ated with the scientific findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (“IPCC”).9
In 1988, the United Nations General Assembly established the
IPCC to provide the governments of the world with a comprehensive as-
sessment of the state of scientific knowledge regarding climate change.10
Worse, 7 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 385, 385 (2004) (claiming that science exacerbates political
controversies associated with environmental issues).
6 See sources cited supra note 4.
7 Jerry Ravetz, The Post-Normal Science of Precaution, 36 FUTURES 347, 347 (2004).
8 See, e.g., U.S. EPA, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT NO. 11-P-0702, PROCEDURAL
REVIEW OF EPA’S GREENHOUSE GASES ENDANGERMENT FINDING DATA QUALITY PROCESSES
(2011); U.S. EPA, RESPONSE TO THE PETITIONS TO RECONSIDER THE ENDANGERMENT AND
CAUSE OR CONTRIBUTE FINDINGS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER SECTION 202(A) OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT, VOL. I, II, III (2010).
9 Judith Curry, On the Credibility of Climate Research, Part II: Towards Rebuilding
Trust, CLIMATE CHANGE BLOG (Feb. 24, 2010) http://curry.eas.gatech.edu/climate/towards
_rebuilding_trust.html.
10 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, ORGANIZATION, http://www
.ipcc.ch/organization/organization.shtml (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the leading
international body for the assessment of climate change. It was estab-
lished by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to provide the world
with a clear scientific view on the current state of knowledge in climate
change and its potential environmental and socio-economic impacts. In
the same year, the UN General Assembly endorsed the action by WMO
and UNEP in jointly establishing the IPCC.
Id.
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The credibility and legitimacy of the IPCC’s assessments have suffered
huge losses among members of the public after several errors were dis-
covered in the most recent IPCC report, the Fourth Assessment Report
(“AR4”), errors which resulted primarily from the IPCC’s mistreatment of
non-peer-reviewed research.11 Perhaps the most widely publicized of these
errors involved a prediction in the AR4 that the world’s glaciers were melt-
ing so fast that those in the Himalayas could disappear by 2035.12 In 2009,
a journalist discovered that this claim was based on a news story he had
written seven years before the Assessment Report, and that the news
story was based on a short telephone interview with a little-known Indian
scientist.13 That scientist subsequently admitted that the claim was not
supported by any formal research,14 and in 2010, the IPCC retracted the
claim.15 As a result, the IPCC instituted a review of its assessment proce-
dures, and concluded that it had to change its practices for handling non-
peer-reviewed literature to ensure these kinds of mistakes do not happen
in the future.16
The issues surrounding the credibility and legitimacy of IPCC
assessments mirror many of the reliability issues regarding the admissi-
bility of scientific evidence at trial. From 1923 to 1993, the “general ac-
ceptance test” articulated in Frye v. United States17 was the standard for
determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Under this test,
the scientific community was charged with determining the validity of sci-
entific evidence.18 In 1993, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, the
Supreme Court held that the Frye standard was superseded by Rule 702
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.19 Instead, the Court created a flexible
11 See INTERACADEMY COUNCIL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE ASSESSMENTS: REVIEW OF THE PROCESSES AND
PROCEDURES OF THE IPCC xiii–xiv (2010).
12 See MARTIN PERRY ET AL. EDS., CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 493 (2007).
13 See Fred Pearce, Claims Himalayan Glaciers Could Melt by 2035 Were False, Says UN
Scientist, GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jan/20
/himalayan-glaciers-melt-claims-false-ipcc.
14 Id.
15 See Press Release, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC Statement on the
Melting of Himalayan Glaciers (Jan. 20, 2011).
16 See INTERACADEMY COUNCIL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 11.
17 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
18 Id.
19 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587 (1993).
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inquiry based on principles and methodology.20 Unlike the standard in
Frye, which essentially outsourced admissibility determinations to the
scientific community, the standard in Daubert and its progeny tasks judges
with separating good science from bad science by using those inquiries.21
The approach in Daubert and its progeny should be used as a frame-
work to vet research in climate change assessments, because it is flexible,
gives the responsibility to the non-scientific community, and rejects a “one
size fits all” model. The best way to achieve this objective is to establish a
domestic institution that is devoted to evaluating the scientific evidence in-
cluded in an IPCC assessment by conducting a more expansive and flexible
review within the Daubert guidelines. By moving away from the “Frye-like”
narrow, scientifically based analysis into a broader public based analysis,
we will be able to restore the legitimacy of climate science. Having more
credible and legitimate assessments will yield other benefits, such as mak-
ing it more likely that the scientific results will be able to inform public
policy, and it will reduce the complexity and confusion of the public debate
by shifting the debate away from the science to the political and social
issues, where it belongs.22
This article will consider the case for instituting a domestic agency
that would evaluate the findings from IPCC assessments to improve the
credibility and legitimacy of those claims and conclusions for multiple
purposes. The proposed agency would consider the robustness of an
assessment’s conclusions by construing the evidence through the lens
of Daubert rather than Frye. Part I will outline the public debate about
climate science—what the debate is about and why it exists. Part II will
examine the current role of the IPCC—what it is and why it has not been
successful in legitimating U.S. policies responding to the potential risks
posed by climate change. Part III will review the Court’s approaches to
the understanding of science in the context of the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence. Part IV will suggest a new framework for reviewing the
IPCC’s assessments based on those standards, and will analyze how that
new framework has the potential to change the public’s view about cli-
mate science.
20 Id. at 594–95.
21 Id.; see United States v. Saelee, 162 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (D. Alaska 2001) (explaining that
“Daubert assigned a gatekeeping function to trial judges to exclude unreliable scientific
expert testimony. Kumho extended this gatekeeping function not only to scientific testi-
mony but also to all expert testimony”).
22 See Sarewitz, supra note 5, at 389.
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I. THE DEBATE ABOUT CLIMATE SCIENCE: WHAT IT IS AND
WHY IT EXISTS
The controversy surrounding climate change science in the United
States has been attributed to the prevalence of scientific illiteracy,23 lack
of familiarity with technical problems,24 industry propaganda25 and politi-
cal luddites.26 Yet, the dispute is not about the basic principles of climate
change science. For example, the scientific basis for the greenhouse effect,
which maintains that greenhouse gases (“GHG”) in the atmosphere trap
and reradiate thermal energy from the sun in all directions, was widely ac-
cepted by scientists long before anyone had heard of anthropogenic climate
change.27 Instead, the main disagreements about climate change science
“are over how certain the research must be to reach various conclusions
and findings, not so much in the substance of the science itself.”28 While
the mere fact of climate change is not controversial, the consequences of
climate change are extraordinarily so.29 Rather, the climate change debate
is about whether climate science can support specific conclusions about
the consequences of climate change with objective scientific facts.30
The climate system is a complicated composite of several sub-
systems, including the hydrosphere, the biosphere, the atmosphere, the
geosphere, and human systems.31 In turn, each of these subsystems
23 See Susanne C. Moser & Julia A. Ekstrom, A Framework to Diagnose Barriers to Climate
Change Adaptation,107 NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 22026, 22028 (2010) (arguing that climate
change is hard for non-specialists to understand, because it is inherently difficult and media
has not sent clear signals for the need to respond for the common good).
24 See Daniel Read et al., What Do People Know About Global Climate Change?, 14 RISK
ANALYSIS: AN INT’L JOURNAL 971, 971 (1994) (arguing that ingrained cognitive and affec-
tive responses to risk may cause people to misinterpret the risks of climate change).
25 See, e.g., Naomi Oreskes & Erik M. Conway, MERCHANTS OF DOUBT (2010); David
Michaels, Doubt Is Their Product, 292 SCI. AM. 96, 96 (2005); Memorandum from Frank
Luntz: A Cleaner, Healthier, and Safer Am. to GOP Cong. Candidates 137 (2002).
26 See JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL, THE INQUISITION OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 1 (2011).
27 See Svante Arrhenius, On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air Upon the Temperature
of the Ground, 41 PHIL. MAG. & J. OF SCI. 237, 263 (1896), available at http://www.rsc.org
/images/Arrhenius1896_tcm18-173546.pdf.
28 See Letter From Michael MacCracken to Margo Schaub, Comments on Draft Guidelines
for Peer Review and Information Quality 2 (Oct. 6 2003).
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 The major components of the climate system bearing on climate change and its conse-
quences over the next century are: the atmosphere, oceans, terrestrial biosphere, glaciers
and ice sheets, and land surface. See IPCC, TECHNICAL PAPER II, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
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encompasses separate components, which include distinct elements and
so on and so forth.32 For example, human systems encompass various eco-
nomic, political and cultural subsystems.33 The climate’s behavior reflects
the collective interactions of these systems and subsystems, but not always
in a linear manner. The so-called “butterfly effect” is a popular metaphor
for explaining the chaotic behavior of complex systems like the Earth’s
climate.34 A butterfly flapping its wings in Asia creates a tropical storm in
the Atlantic Ocean a few weeks later.35 In complex systems, the slightest
variation in initial conditions can create large deviations in future system
conditions over time, and not necessarily in predictable ways.36
The controversy about whether the science can support conclu-
sions about the impact of climate change is a result of the uncertainty that
is intrinsic to this kind of complex system. In particular, there are three
dynamics driving the deadlock over climate change. First, “[s]ignificant
[scientific] uncertainties plague projections of climate change and its con-
sequences.”37 Second, the projected consequences of climate change are
loaded with value judgments, which may be perfectly legitimate but are
often hidden.38 Third, the problem posed by climate change can be framed
to accommodate a plurality of fundamentally different but equally legiti-
mate perspectives.39
SIMPLE CLIMATE MODELS USED IN THE IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT 1997 [herein-
after IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER II].
32 Id.
33 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE 26 (Paul C. Stern et
al. eds., 1992).
34 Edward Lorenz, the mathematician who discovered “sensitive dependence on initial
conditions” and pioneered chaos theory, coined this metaphor in a speech, “Does the Flap
of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set off a Tornado in Texas,” he delivered in 1973. See
Edward N. Lorenz, Predictability: Does the Flap of a Butterfly’s Wings in Brazil Set Off
a Tornado in Texas? at the 139th Meeting of the Am. Ass’n for the Advancement of Sci.
(Dec. 29, 1972), in EDWARD N. LORENZ, THE ESSENCE OF CHAOS 181 (1993).
35 See John Quiggin, Complexity, Climate Change and the Precautionary Principle 6 (Univ.
of Queensland Risk & Sustainable Mgmt. Grp, Working Paper No. C07#3), available at
http://www.uq.edu.au/rsmg/WP/WPC07_3.pdf (noting that nonlinearities in the system
may enhance stability or generate instability).
36 Id.
37 Stephen H. Schneider & Kristin Kuntz-Duriseti, Uncertainty and Climate Change Policy,
in CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY: A SURVEY 54 (Stephen H. Schneider et al. eds., 2002).
38 See Daniel A. Farber, Uncertainty, 99 GEO. L.J. 901 (2011).
39 In the context of climate change, problem framing, value-loading and uncertainty have
allowed questions of social value to be transformed into questions of scientific fact. Each of
these three dynamics are intrinsic to the production of climate science. See, e.g., Schneider
& Kuntz-Duriseti, supra note 37.
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A. Uncertainties of the Science
While today’s best estimates predict that average global tempera-
tures will rise between 2 to 4°C by the year 2100 as a result of anthropo-
genic climate change, the variability of these estimates is relatively large.40
Moreover, decades of research suggest that it may not be possible to obtain
a definitive reduction in this uncertainty within the time frame needed to
avoid the worst effects of climate change.41 As a result, uncertainty associ-
ated with climate change and its impacts has become the greatest problem
for policy makers.
The term “uncertainty” encompasses a spectrum of meanings rang-
ing from a lack of absolute precision to such vagueness as to preclude
anything other than speculation. The sources of uncertainty are equally
diverse, including linguistic imprecision, measurement errors, approxima-
tion and many others. Science is no stranger to uncertainty. It is an intrin-
sic aspect of the scientific enterprise.42 So why has uncertainty become
so salient in climate change science, especially in the context of the pro-
jected consequences of climate change?43 To begin, in the context of climate
change, the conventional sources of scientific uncertainty are compounded
by their scale, long time horizons and, “the impossibility of before-the-fact
experimental controls.”44
Climate change takes place at many scales, from the atmosphere
as a whole, to local micro-climates and the ecosystems they support.45
40 See GEORGE BACKUS ET AL., SANDIA REPORT ASSESSING THE NEAR-TERM RISK OF CLIMATE
UNCERTAINTY: INTERDEPENDENCIES AMONG THE U.S. STATES 9 (2010).
41 Id.
42 See Climate Change Research and Scientific Integrity: Hearing on S. 1060 Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 110th Cong. 73, 76 (2007) (statement of Peter Gleick,
President of Pacific Inst.). “Absolute certainty in science, or even in politics, is a rare luxury,
and never guaranteed. Insisting that scientists provide certainty before setting vital public
policy is a recipe for inaction and delay . . . .” Id.
43 See Martijntje Smits, Taming Monsters: The Cultural Domestication of New Technology,
28 TECH. SOC’Y 489 (2004).
44 Richard H. Moss & Stephen H. Schneider, Uncertainties in the IPCC TAR: Recom-
mendations to Lead Authors for More Consistent Assessment and Reporting, GUIDANCE
PAPERS ON THE CROSS CUTTING ISSUES OF THE THIRD ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 33,
35 (R. Pachauri et al. eds., 2000), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf /supporting-material
/guidance-papers-3rd-assessment.pdf.
45 See, e.g., Quiggin, supra note 35, at 7 (noting that complex systems may encompass
“emergent” effects, which arise when “behaviour at some scale of aggregation, such as a
national economy or a global climate system cannot be derived by modelling behaviour
at a more disaggregated scale, such as that of individual industries or components of the
climate system”). See also JOSEPH Y. HALPERN, REASONING ABOUT UNCERTAINTY (2003).
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Climate change projections are also affected by structural sources of un-
certainty arising from the complex interactions between socioeconomic,
biological, and atmospheric systems.46 These interactions within the climate
system, such as changes in the dynamics of cloud formation and in the
development of tropical cyclones, are frequently non-linear. For instance,
rising temperatures may result in more frequent and more intense bush-
fires, which in turn produce massive emissions of CO2 and lead to further
warming.47 The future interactions of human activities and these natural
processes is likely the greatest source of uncertainty in climate models.48
B. Judgments and Assumptions in the Analysis
Within the scientific community, there are normative judgments
that are made about the choice of model used, the parameters selected,
and where system boundaries are drawn for purposes of describing the
problem.49 This is known as value loading.50 In varying degrees, all statis-
tical analysis is affected by value loading. As one contemporary philosopher
of science explained: “[a]ll statistical tests are value-loaded, necessarily
designed to avoid one or another sort of error . . . any test might be overly
selective, rejecting correlations that are probably real; or it might be overly
sensitive, accepting correlations that are probably accidental . . . . It is
impossible to design a statistical test which avoids both types of error;
there must be a choice, made by someone, somewhere.”51
46 See Moss & Schneider, supra note 44, at 39.
The process whereby uncertainty accumulates throughout the process
of climate change prediction and impact assessment has been variously
described as a “cascade of uncertainty” or the “uncertainty explosion.”
When an assessment progresses from the biogeochemical cycle to radia-
tive forcing and climate sensitivity calculations through to economic and
social outcomes, including valuations of climate damages, considerable
uncertainty can be accumulated.
Id.
47 See Quiggin, supra note 35, at 7.
48 See FACILITATING CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES: A REPORT OF TWO WORKSHOPS ON
KNOWLEDGE FROM THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (Paul C. Stern & Roger E.
Kasperson eds., 2010).
49 See passim U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI. PROGRAM, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS (2009).
50 See Jeroen P. van der Sluijs et al., Exploring the Quality of Evidence for Complex and
Contested Policy Decisions, 3 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1 (2008) [hereinafter Policy Decisions].
51 See Ravetz, supra note 7, at 5 (internal citations omitted).
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In many circumstances, these choices have enormous impacts on
the outcomes of the analysis.52 For example, this inevitable discretion has
created considerable difficulties in the context of computer simulations
of the Earth’s climate used to project the consequences of climate change.53
Computer models project future conditions of the climate system by sim-
ulating the interactions of the system’s primary components—clouds,
oceans, atmosphere and so forth.54 Some of the processes, variables, and
parameters that create uncertainty are treated exogenously as assump-
tions, especially as the number of linkages among different subject areas
and scenarios expands.55
A less appreciated but equally significant “assumption” made in
climate change analyses is the choice of discount rates used to assess the
economic consequences of climate change.56 Given that climate change
takes place over centuries, the impact of compound interest on climate
change economics is critical. “It is not an exaggeration to say that the big-
gest uncertainty of all in the economics of climate change is the uncertainty
about which interest rate to use for discounting.”57 The validity of these
kinds of projections is a flashpoint in the climate change controversy.58
When scientists use different assumptions, they lead to different results.
Those judgments and assumptions lead to distrust in the result.
52 See Stephen Schneider, Integrated Assessment Modeling of Global Climate Change:
Transparent Rational Tool for Policy Making or Opaque Screen Hiding Value-Laden
Assumptions?, 2 ENVTL. MODELING & ASSESSMENT 229, 239 (1997).
53 See Jens C. Refsgaard et al., Uncertainty in the Environmental Modelling Process, 22
ENVTL. MODELING & SOFTWARE 1543, 1547 (2007).
54 See, e.g., U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, CLIMATE MODELS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF STRENGTHS AND LIMITATIONS (2008); IPCC, AN INTRODUCTION TO SIMPLE CLIMATE
MODELS USED IN THE IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT (1997).
55 THE ROYAL SOCIETY, CLIMATE CHANGE CONTROVERSIES: A SIMPLE GUIDE 7 (Dec. 2008)
(“[C]omputer models cannot exactly predict the future, since there are so many unknowns
concerning what might happen. Scientists model a range of future possible climates using
different scenarios of what the world will ‘look like’. Each scenario makes different as-
sumptions about important factors such as how the world’s population may increase, what
policies might be introduced to deal with climate change and how much carbon dioxide
and other greenhouse gases humans will pump into the atmosphere.”).
56 See Martin Weitzman, A Review of The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change, 45 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 705 (2007).
57 Id.
58 IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER II, supra note 31, at 5.
There is considerable uncertainty about the changes that might occur
in some climate system processes, such as those involving clouds, in an
altered climate. The effect of aerosols on the radiation balance of the
climate is also not well known. Difficult-to-predict changes in the ocean
circulation could have a significant effect on both regional and global 
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C. The Framing of the Issue
People’s understanding of climate change is shaped by “frames,” or
underlying structures of perception, knowledge, and behavior.59 Public re-
sponse to climate change is not a linear response to scientific information.
Rather, people are already predisposed either to accept or reject what sci-
entists say about it, and similarly, to support or oppose proposed policies.60
As an example, one scholar has identified “six Americas,” each character-
ized by a unique set of understandings of and responses to climate change.61
These six distinct groups, or segments, vary in terms of how much they be-
lieve global warming is a reality, how concerned they are, and how moti-
vated they are to take action.62
A series of recent surveys and polls have suggested that a person’s
political orientation is by far the strongest statistical indicator of his or
her views about the legitimacy and credibility of climate change science.63
Republicans and ideological conservatives are more likely to doubt the sci-
ence behind climate change than Democrats and liberals.64 The converse—
liberals are more likely to trust the science behind climate change than
conservatives—is also true.65 In perhaps the most compelling analysis to
date, Aaron McCright and Riley Dunlap evaluated data from ten Gallup
polls between 2001 and 2010 to show that the gulf of understanding be-
tween liberals/Democrats and conservatives/Republicans on the subject
of climate change science has grown over the past decade.66 McCright and
Dunlap also found that rather than reconciling political and social differ-
ences, science seems to be deepening them.67
climatic changes. Unexpected changes in the flow of carbon between
the atmosphere and terrestrial biosphere and/or the oceans could occur.
Id.; see also Naomie Oreskes et al., Verification, Validation, and Conformation of Numerical
Models in the Earth Sciences, 263 SCI. 641 (1994).
59 See DONALD A. SCHÖN & MARTIN REIN, FRAME REFLECTION: TOWARD THE RESOLUTION
OF INTRACTABLE POLICY CONTROVERSIES 23 (1995).
60 See Andrew J. Hoffman, Climate Science as Culture War, STANFORD SOCIAL INNOVATION
REVIEW, available at http://www.ssireview.org/articles/entry/climate_science_as_culture
_war (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
61 See LEISEROWITZ ET AL., GLOBAL WARMING’S SIX AMERICAS 2009, supra note 2, at 3.
62 Id. at 20–21.
63 Id. at 24.
64 Id.
65 See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ ET AL., POLITICS & GLOBAL WARMING: DEMOCRATS, REPUB-
LICANS, INDEPENDENTS, AND THE TEA PARTY 21–23, 4 (2011), available at http://environment
.yale.edu/climate/item/PoliticsGlobalWarming2011 [hereinafter LEISEROWITZ ET AL., POLITICS
& GLOBAL WARMING].
66 See McCright & Dunlap, supra note 4.
67 Id. at 161.
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Several other recent studies have similarly challenged the pre-
vailing wisdom by showing that the more people claim to know about
climate change science, the more likely they are to express politically
partisan views.68 For example, Tea Party members are more likely than
members of any other political party to describe themselves as “very well
informed” about climate change and express doubts about whether climate
change is happening.69 In one very large survey, two scholars concluded
that individuals who are “predisposed by their values to dismiss climate
change evidence” are likely to become more dismissive as their scientific
literacy increases.70
Climate change can accommodate a plurality of perspectives.71
Climate change can be described as different “problems” depending on
how one organizes the various elements, which encompass biodiversity,
energy, demographic patterns, and several other fields of knowledge.72
Each of these ways of looking at the problem of climate
change involves a variety of interests and values, and each
may call on a body of relevant knowledge to help under-
stand and respond to the problem. Not only may the inter-
ests, values, and knowledge relevant to one way of under-
standing the problem be, in small part or large, different
from those associated with another way, but they may also
be contradictory.73
For example, members of an island community may evaluate evi-
dence suggesting that climate change would significantly increase sea
levels differently than those residing in locations far away from the ocean.74
Similarly, agricultural communities may evaluate evidence suggesting
that climate change would worsen seasonal droughts differently than
non-agricultural communities.75 These perspectives would likely shape
68 Id. at 171–72.
69 See LEISEROWITZ ET AL., POLITICS & GLOBAL WARMING, supra note 65, at 4.
70 See Dan M. Kahan et al., The Tragedy of the Risk-Perception Commons: Culture Conflict,
Rationality Conflict, and Climate Change (Yale L. Sch. Cultural Cognition Project, Working
Paper No. 89, 2011) (finding that survey respondents were “predisposed by their values to
dismiss climate change evidence became more dismissive, and those predisposed by their
values to credit such evidence more concerned, as science literacy and numeracy increased”).
71 See Hans Von Storch, Presentation at the InterAcademy Council IPCC Review Meeting
(June 15, 2010).
72 See Sarewitz, supra note 5, at 389.
73 Id.
74 See id.
75 See id.
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resulting preferences on policy options for managing the risks posed by
climate change.76 In addition, as previously discussed, the institutional
and legal parameters framing climate change have facilitated competing
interpretations of climate change science.77
These “divergent frames” can become a potential source of intrac-
table conflicts.78 People with incompatible perspectives can only commu-
nicate meaningfully if their frames share some modicum of similarity.79
As a result, how we frame the climate change problem provides the param-
eters not only for how society should respond, but also whether society
should respond.80 Along with the scientific uncertainties of climate change
science and the accumulating evidence linking the public’s perception of
climate change with other social and political preference, climate science
has become a proxy for deeper disputes about social, economic and polit-
ical values.81 The question of whether society and policy makers should
respond at all to the climate change problem, and if so, how, has been
stymied by the lack of an effective institutional mechanism to manage
these dynamics.
76 See Sheila Jasanoff, Comment on Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Proposed
Bulletin on Peer Review and Information Quality (2003), available at http://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2003iq/159.pdf [hereinafter OMB Peer Review].
77 See Robert W. Kates, Thomas M. Parris & Anthony A. Leiserowitz, What Is Sustainable
Development? Goals, Indicators, Values, and Practice, 47 ENV’T: SCI. & POL’Y SUSTAINABLE
DEV. 8 (2005).
There was ready agreement in the literature that sustainable develop-
ment implies linking what is to be sustained with what is to be developed,
but here, too, the emphasis has often differed from extremes of “sustain
only” to “develop mostly” to various forms of “and/or.” Similarly, the time
period of concern, ambiguously described in the standard definition as
“now and in the future,” has differed widely. It has been defined from
as little as a generation—when almost everything is sustainable—to
forever—when surely nothing is sustainable.
Id. at 12.
78 See SCHÖN & REIN, supra note 59, at xix.
79 See Joop De Boer, Frames and Tools for Public Participation, CLIMATE RESEARCH
NETHERLANDS—RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS 54 (2009).
80 In the context of ecosystem management, Donald N. Michael argued that: “More infor-
mation provides an ever-larger pool out of which interest parties can fish differing positions
on the history of what has led to current circumstances, on what is now happening, on what
needs to be done, and on what the consequences will be.” Donald N. Michael, Barriers
and Bridges to Learning in a Turbulent Human Ecology, in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO
THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 461, 473 (Lance H. Gunderson et al.
eds., 1995).
81 See Jeroen P. van der Sluijs, Post Normal Science: Working Deliberatively Within
Imperfections, Lecture at Studium Generale of Wageningen University (Mar 21, 2007).
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II. THE IPCC—WHAT IT IS AND WHY IT HAS NOT BEEN SUCCESSFUL
The United Nations General Assembly established the IPCC in
1988 to prepare “a comprehensive review and recommendations with
respect to the state of knowledge of the science of climate and climate
change.”82 Nearly a quarter century later, the IPCC has completed four
climate change assessment reports and in the process has become “the
largest and most complex orchestration of sustained international scien-
tific co-operation the world has ever seen.”83 Despite this impressive track
record, the IPCC’s impact on policy has been hampered by a lack of public
legitimacy and credibility.84 These problems stem from the quality-control
procedures the IPCC has relied on to produce its assessments, which were
designed for managing the challenges associated with “research science”
but have proven to be inadequate for managing the credibility and legiti-
macy issues encountered in the context of “regulatory science.”
A. What IPCC Is
The IPCC is responsible for determining whether climate change
science is sufficiently certain to support the implementation of climate
policies.85 The IPCC was assigned this responsibility in Article 2 of the
82 G.A. Res. 43/53, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec. 6, 1988). The IPCC was asked to pre-
pare “a comprehensive review and recommendations with respect to the state of knowledge
of the science of climate and climate change,” with special emphasis on global warming.
Id. The IPCC’s assessments have vast implications for the world’s multitrillion-dollar
energy economy and the 194 U.N. member nations that rely on it. See Shardul Agrawala,
Structural and Process History of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 39
CLIMATIC CHANGE 621 (1998).
83 See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, KNOWLEDGE, NETWORKS AND NATIONS: GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC
COLLABORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 79–80 (2011), available at http://royalsociety.org
/uploadedfiles/royal_society_content/influencing_policy/reports/2011-03-28-knowledge
-networks-nations.pdf. The 2007 Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) involved 130 countries,
450 lead authors, 800 contributing authors and 2,500 scientific expert reviewers. The
AR4 cited 18,000 peer-reviewed publications and included 90,000 comments from experts
and Governments. See Rajendra Pachauri, Climate Change Assessments: Review of the
Processes and Procedures of the IPCC, Statement at the Cancun Climate Change Con-
ference (Nov. 29, 2010) (transcript available at http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net
/PachauriStatement.html).
84 See Lyle Scruggs, Professor of Political Sci. Univ. of Conn., Declining Public Concern
About Climate Change: Can We Blame the Great Recession?, Presented at 2010 World
Congress of Sociology Meeting in Gothenburg, Sweden (July 2010), at 6, available at
http://www.sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/gecsub.pdf.
85 See FIRST ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC (1990).
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U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change,86 which provides that
“[t]he ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instru-
ments . . . is to achieve . . . stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations
in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”87 So the basic question that the IPCC
is charged with is determining what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system” under Article 2.88
The IPCC’s principal task is “to provide a sound scientific basis
that would enable policymakers to better interpret dangerous anthropo-
genic interference with the climate system.”89 The IPCC’s assessments also
provide guidance on what policy options are available for achieving the
Article 2 objectives.90 The IPCC explained its role in addressing the twin
challenges posed by Article 2:
The challenges presented to the policymaker by Article 2
are the determination of what concentrations of greenhouse
gases might be regarded as “dangerous anthropogenic in-
terference with the climate system” and the charting of
a future which allows for economic development which is
sustainable. The purpose of this synthesis report is to pro-
vide scientific, technical and socioeconomic information that
can be used, inter alia, in addressing these challenges.91
By establishing what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic inter-
ference with the climate system,” the IPCC has unrivaled influence on the
86 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107
[hereinafter UNFCCC].
87 Id. The UNFCCC does not indicate the level of total GHG concentrations beyond which
“dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” would occur. Nor does it
state a limit for total anthropogenic GHG emissions required to achieve its objective. Id.
88 Id.
89 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SECOND ASSESSMENT: A REPORT
OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (1995), http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf
/climate-changes-1995/ipcc-2nd-assessment/2nd-assessment-en.pdf [hereinafter SECOND
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC].
90 See id. at iii, 36–42. While the IPCC and the Convention are legally distinct and separate
entities, the Kyoto Protocol, in its Articles 3 and 5, requires the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to take into account, among other
things, the methodological work of IPCC when it makes relevant decisions pertaining to
those Articles. In this context, the work of IPCC is institutionally recognized by the Frame-
work Convention in Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol. See Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 33, 35, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22.
91 See SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC, supra note 89, at 3.
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question of whether climate change science is sufficiently certain to sup-
port implementation of various climate change policies.92 The quality of the
IPCC’s assessments is therefore at the center of the climate debate.
B. Why the IPCC’s Assessments Have Not Been Effective Within the
United States
Over the past decade, Congress has enacted a constellation of new
administrative laws and procedures for policing the reliability of scientific
information used to promulgate federal regulations. For example, the Data
Access Act (“DAA”) replicates Daubert’s falsifiability prong in the form of
the so-called “reproducibility” requirement to ensure “the quality, objectiv-
ity, utility, and integrity of information (including statistical information)
disseminated by Federal agencies.”93 Similarly, the Information Quality
Act (“IQA”) requires federal agencies to subject all “influential” informa-
tion used in the rulemaking process to minimum peer-review standards.94
These minimum standards are specified in guidelines that are non-binding
norms.95 Rules are developed under the Administrative Procedure Act, and
require an agency to provide notice and invite public comment.96 Ordinarily,
rules are binding on both the agency and the public.
These legal requirements will shape how (and whether) federal
agencies incorporate IPCC assessments into the rulemaking process. For
example, an analysis by the U.S. EPA’s Inspector General concluded that
the agency had not fulfilled its obligations under the IQA when it relied on
the IPCC’s assessments to support its GHG endangerment finding without
submitting the assessment to additional peer review.97 Under the IQA, if
92 Id. (citing the UNFCCC).
93 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agents, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,718, 49,722 (Sept. 28,
2001). Statutorily designated steering documents for policymaking that qualify as
“influential scientific or statistical information” must meet a “reproducibility” standard,
setting forth transparency regarding data and methods of analysis, “as a quality standard
above and beyond some peer review quality standards.” Id.
94 Id. The Information Quality Act (IQA) was an obscure rider to the Treasury and General
Government Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001. Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, App. C §515(a), 114 Stat. 2763,
2763A-153 (2001) [hereinafter Information Quality Act].
95 Guidelines for Ensuring and Maximizing the Quality, Objectivity, Utility, and Integrity
of Information Disseminated by Federal Agents, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,718, 49,719 (Sept. 28,
2001) (describing the guidelines as a “performance goal”).
96 Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237, 239 (1946).
97 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, PROCEDURAL
REVIEW OF EPA’S GREENHOUSE GASES ENDANGERMENT FINDING DATA QUALITY PROCESSES,
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a regulation “is supported by influential scientific information or a highly
influential scientific assessment, the underlying” information typically
requires peer review prior to the agency proposing regulation.98 The IQA
requires information to be subject to more stringent peer-review procedures
than those followed by the IPCC.99
The purpose of the IPCC’s assessments is to provide support for reg-
ulatory change.100 In assessing scientific information, however, the IPCC
has institutionalized procedures and standards commonly used in the con-
text of research science.101 The procedures used to support research science
are more stringent than procedures and standards used in the context of
regulatory science.102 Research science serves different goals, produces
different forms of scientific knowledge, relies on different mechanisms of
accountability, and follows distinct procedures and standards for quality
control purposes.103
By relying on procedures designed for “research science,” specifically
peer-reviewed published articles, the IPCC has not effectively managed
the credibility and legitimacy challenges that commonly affect scientific
research conducted primarily for promulgating public policy.104 The discon-
nect between the IPCC’s procedures for preparing climate change assess-
ments and the distinct challenges scientific assessors commonly encounter
when producing knowledge for policy is illustrated by recent IPCC inci-
dents related to possible conflicts of interest and failure to follow official
procedures for the use of non-peer-reviewed scientific research.105
REPORT NO. 11-P-0702 (Sept. 26, 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2011
/20110926-11-P-0702.pdf.
98 U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, PEER REVIEW HANDBOOK 15 (3d ed. 2006). “[S]oliciting com-
ments from stakeholders and the general public after a rule is proposed does not constitute
peer review.” Id.
99 See id. at 12. “Typically, peer involvement takes two general forms: peer input (ongoing
discussions during the development of the work product) and peer review (an evaluation
of a work plan, preliminary draft or the like, or the final objective expert evaluation of the
work product).” Id. (underlining omitted).
100 See SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC 3; UNFCCC.
101 See SECOND ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE IPCC Foreword.
102 See OMB Peer Review, supra note 76, at 8.
103 See id. at 3 (“[t]hese differences include: Goals of scientists and scientific assessors;
Institutions in which science is done; Products of scientific activity; Incentives and rewards
for producing science; Time-frame within which science must be done; Options for action
available to decision-makers; and, Accountability for results.”).
104 Jeroen van der Sluijs et al., Beyond Consensus: Reflections From a Democratic Perspective
on the Interaction Between Climate Politics and Science, 2 CURRENT OPINION IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 409 (2010).
105 See INTERACADEMY COUNCIL COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 11, at vii, 60, 61, 63.
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The IPCC’s lack of a conflict of interest policy or an alternative
mechanism for avoiding actual or perceived conflicts of interest is illus-
trative of its reliance on procedures designed for “research science.”106
As a result, despite the value-laden nature of climate change projections,
the IPCC has treated assessment authors, reviewers, contributors and
commenters as objective, disinterested sources of scientific information
rather than stakeholders.107 For example, the chairman of the IPCC,
R.A. Pachauri has been criticized for conflicts of interest resulting from
financial interests he holds in various energy and carbon-trading busi-
nesses.108 This has eroded the IPCC’s credibility among many members
of the public.109
The procedures being used by the IPCC to evaluate climate change
science need to be reconsidered. The purpose of the IPCC’s assessment is
to provide support for regulatory change.110 Therefore, it is not appropri-
ate to use methods that are meant to provide support for research science,
where the search is for certainty and statistical significance. There needs
to be a more flexible approach that supports the goals of policy and regu-
latory change. Without that support, the IPCC’s assessments will not lead
to climate change policy in the United States.
106 See Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Major Change Is Needed if the IPCC Hopes to Survive, YALE
ENV’T 360 (Feb. 25, 2010), http://e360.yale.edu/content/feature.msp?id=2244. “The parent
bodies of the IPCC—the United Nations and World Meteorological Organization—do have
conflict of interest policies, but they do not apply to the IPCC.” Id.
107 See Weitzman, supra note 56, at 705.
Overall, I believe it is fair to say that the Stern Review consistently leans
toward (and consistently phrases issues in terms of) assumptions and for-
mulations that emphasize optimistically low expected costs of mitigation
and pessimistically high expected damages from greenhouse warming—
relative to most other studies of the economics of climate change. But far
more crucially, the key assumption that drives its strong conclusions is
the mundane fact that a very low interest rate is postulated, with which
distant-future benefits and costs are then discounted.
Id.
108 Pachauri Accused of Making ‘Fortune’ from Carbon Trading Firms, MSN NEWS (Dec. 21,
2009), http://news.in.msn.com/international/article.aspx?cp-documentid=3490272.
109 See id. Several other recent similar incidents have created credibility problems for the
IPCC. “Because the IPCC has no requirement for disclosure of potential conflicts, it is likely
that the organization itself is unaware of what other potential conflicts may [impact its
legitimacy and credibility].” Pielke, supra note 106. Other institutions have stringent con-
flict policies. Id.
110 See UNFCCC; United Nations Environmental Programme, Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change: Outline of an Assessment, 4, 7, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IPBES/3/INF/13 (Jun. 7,
2010).
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III. DAUBERT AND ITS PROGENY: A MODEL FOR EXAMINING SCIENCE
The controversy over climate change science is a disagreement over
whether the evidence of climate change is sufficiently certain or reliable
to justify or require policy action.111 The IPCC’s procedures are not scien-
tifically flawed, but rather lack the flexibility needed to raise or lower the
thresholds needed to establish reliability and relevance as the circum-
stances require.112 This issue is the same one that has confronted the courts
as they have had to determine the correct standard for the admissibility
of scientific evidence.113 An examination of the courts’ treatment of sci-
entific evidence and its current approach under Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals114 and its progeny provides guidance for the treatment
of science within the IPCC.
A. History of the Legal Standard for the Admissibility of Evidence
The courts have always had to struggle with the intersection of
law, policy, and science through the admissibility of scientific evidence.115
Before 1923, judges generally based admissibility upon an assessment of
the expert rather than the testimony; experts had to be qualified, and qual-
ification was often based on the expert’s popularity in the “commercial
marketplace.”116 As might be expected, this test frequently failed to distin-
guish valid science from entertainment, and excluded certain fields of sci-
ence entirely.117 Perhaps even more importantly, courts never questioned
111 See id. at 3.
112 See Principles Governing IPCC Work, App. A, Procedures for the Preparation, Review,
Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports, Annex 2 (adopted at the
Fifteenth Session, San Jose April 15–18, 1999), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc
-principles/ipcc-principles-appendix-a.pdf [hereinafter Appendix A].
113 See Bert Black, The Supreme Court’s View of Science: Has Daubert Exorcised the
Certainty Demon?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2129 (1994).
114 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
115 See SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICY MAKERS xi,
xii, 39, 40 (1990).
116 Before the sixteenth century, experts were usually part of the jury. See John Baston,
The Court Expert in Civil Trials—A Comparative Appraisal, 40 MOD. L. REV. 174, 175
(1977); John B. Chapin, Experts and Expert Testimony, 22 ALB. L.J. 365 (1880). The term
“commercial marketplace” is used by the authors in David L. Faigman et al., Check Your
Crystal Ball at the Courtroom Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present,
and Worrying About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1803,
1804 (1994).
117 See Faigman et al., supra note 116, at 1805.
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whether a body of knowledge existed separately from the expert who pos-
sessed it.118
In Frye v. United States,119 the Defendant offered the results from
an early form of polygraph testing, called the “systolic blood pressure de-
ception test,” to support his plea of not guilty to a murder charge.120 This
presented a novel scientific question as it was a new technique where there
was no commercial marketplace and in fact, might never be one.121 In ana-
lyzing whether the evidence should be admitted, the court created what
has become known as the “general acceptance”122 test, drawing the line for
admissibility on whether the scientific principle underlying the evidence
is accepted by a sufficient portion of the relevant scientific community.123
This “general acceptance test” became the dominant standard for deter-
mining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.124 This new standard
separated the expertise from the expert, thereby creating the idea that
the body of knowledge had to be evaluated apart from the notoriety of the
expert. It also allowed new kinds of science to be assessed, even if they
might never find a place in the “commercial marketplace.”125
Despite these improvements, the test merely shifted the expertise
from the purchasers of the science to the sellers of the science.126 The eval-
uation of the science still belonged to the scientists.127 In fact, the stan-
dard was so similar that the analysis in Frye went unnoticed for years. No
articles were written about it, courts did not cite it, and commentators
118 Id.
119 293 F. 1013 (1923).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1014.
122 Id.
123 In a brief, citation free opinion, the Second Circuit stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in
this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized,
and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 585–86 (1993) (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
124 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
125 Faigman et al., supra note 116, at 1806.
126 Michael Saks et al., Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, SJ081 ALI-ABA 1 (Am. Law
Inst. 2004).
127 Paul Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States,
A Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1207 (1980).
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ignored it.128 But, as the distinction between experts and expertise became
more apparent to the courts, as new fields and specializations began to a
rise, and as old fields began to offer new knowledge, the Frye test became
the standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.129 Judges had to
look towards the scientific community as a whole to assess the validity of
scientific evidence.130 If the science was not the subject of general accep-
tance among scientists, it was not appropriate for the jury.131
By the 1970s, courts and commentators began to attack the Frye
test in earnest.132 Some critics said that the test was too conservative be-
cause it excluded scientific evidence that was too new to be accepted in the
scientific community, thus forcing the courts to prefer older information.133
Others found the test difficult to apply and determined that it generated
anomalous results.134 Courts had to determine what field of science it was,
what part of the evidence needed general acceptance the theory behind the
science or the technique itself, and what kind of evidence demonstrated
general acceptance scientific literature: judicial opinions, expert testimony,
or some combination of the two.135
In 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence offered another standard for
the admissibility of scientific information.136 Under the Federal Rules, in
order to be admissible, scientific evidence, like any other evidence, had
to be relevant.137 In addition, it had to satisfy Rule 702, which stated that
“[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
128 Daubert, at 585 (citing ERIC D. GREEN & CHARLES R. NESSON, PROBLEMS, CASES, AND
MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE 649 (1983)) (“In the 70 years since its formulation in the Frye
case, the ‘general acceptance’ test has been the dominant standard for determining the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence at trial.”); see id. (“The Frye test has its origin in
a short and citation-free 1923 decision concerning the admissibility of evidence derived from
a systolic blood pressure deception test, a crude precursor to the polygraph machine”).
129 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
130 Giannelli, supra note 127, at 1204–05.
131 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 586.
132 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (citing PAUL GIANNELLI & EDWARD IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE §§ 1–5, 10–14 (2d ed., 1991) (“Although under increasing attack of late, the rule
continues to be followed by a majority of courts, including the Ninth Circuit.”)).
133 See, e.g., GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 132, at 27.
134 See id. at 16.
135 See Daniel Klein, Annotation, Reliability of Scientific Technique and Its Acceptance
Within Scientific Community as Affecting Admissibility, at Federal Trial, of Expert Testimony
as to Result of Test or Study Based on Such Technique-Modern Cases, 105 A.L.R. FED. 299,
at 303–05.
136 See FED. R. EVID. 402.
137 See id.
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witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”138
Although the Federal Rules and the accompanying Advisory Notes did
not mention the Frye criteria, a majority of the federal circuits and most
states imported the Frye analysis into the Federal Rules test.139 While
the Rules were widely regarded as having been intended to allow greater
access to scientific experts, a majority of jurisdictions continued to hold
that the general acceptance standard was still required.140
In 1993, the Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,141 holding that the Frye “general acceptance test” was
superseded by Rule 702.142 The Court set out a two-part analysis based
on the requirements of the Rule.143
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the
trial judge must determine at the outset . . . whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that
(2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine
a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testi-
mony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.144
To assist with the analysis, the Court suggested that the judges
consider four factors: (1) whether the evidence can be and has been tested;
(2) whether the evidence has been subjected to peer review and publication;
(3) the known or potential rate of error for the technique or evidence seek-
ing to be admitted; and (4) the general acceptance of the technique or evi-
dence in the scientific community.145 The Frye standard appeared as an
appropriate, although not exclusive, inquiry.146 Instead, the Court created
a flexible inquiry based on principles and methodology rather than the
specific conclusions that may be generated by the specific evidence.147 As
138 FED. R. EVID. 702.
139 See Saks et al., supra note 126. See also Alice Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert
Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90
A.L.R. 5th 453 (2001).
140 See Saks et al., supra note 126.
141 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
142 Id. at 589.
143 Id. at 592.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 593–94.
146 Id. at 594.
147 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
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a result of Daubert, the evaluation of accuracy and usefulness of science
knowledge shifted from the scientists, whether they are part of the com-
mercial or intellectual marketplace, to the judges.148
Following Daubert, the Supreme Court decided General Electric Co.
v. Joiner149 in 1997 and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael150 in 1999. In Joiner,
the Court held that the standard of review for Daubert admissibility deci-
sions should be the deferential abuse of discretion standard, and found
that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to allow
expert testimony that supported the plaintiff’s theory of cancer exposure.151
In Kumho, the Court held that the Daubert guidelines apply not only to
scientific knowledge, but also to technical or specialized knowledge and
wherever the methods, data, principles, or application of expert testimony
is an issue, the Daubert analysis should be applied.152 Taken together, the
three cases generated a new standard for the admissibility of scientific evi-
dence by making the judges the gatekeepers, outlining four criteria for the
judges to consider, confirming that the judge may use whichever of those
criteria is helpful under the circumstances, and giving the judges complete
deference in their decision making.153
B. Parallels Between the Issues Presented by the Frye Test and the
IPCC’s Approach
There are parallels between the criticisms surrounding Frye’s
“general acceptance” standard and the criticisms resulting from the IPCC’s
assessment process. The “general acceptance” standard, originally devel-
oped for research science, was being used to regulate the quality of science
148 Id. at 595–97.
149 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
150 Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
151 See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136–37.
152 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137.
153 The Daubert trilogy holdings were incorporated into Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 2000.
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise
if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, (b) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (c) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles and method; and (d) the
expert has reliably applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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in the regulatory area of litigation.154 This was unsuccessful because re-
search science and litigation have different objectives.155 Research science
seeks to demonstrate “certainty,” while litigation aims to resolve differences
in areas where facts are uncertain and values are in dispute.156 In addition,
the burden of proof for research science is much higher than the legal bur-
den of proof.157 As a result, the Court in Daubert changed the approach,
shifting the focus of the analysis for admissibility from scientific certainty
to the validity of the process underlying testimony.158
Similarly, the IPCC’s rules of procedures limit information included
in climate change assessments to research published in peer-reviewed
journals.159 The IPCC allows a limited exception for non-peer-reviewed
literature—which is also referred to as “grey literature.”160 Aside from this
limited exception, the IPCC imposes a uniform peer-review process on all
three Working Groups involved in the production of climate change as-
sessments.161 This rigidity is problematic because it risks excluding valid
research in some scenarios and admitting illegitimate research in other
scenarios.162 Using this standard to regulate the quality of science in a
regulatory area has been unsuccessful, for the same reasons the “general
acceptance” standard was unsuccessful in the litigation context.163 The
IPCC needs to adopt an approach more similar to the test enunciated by
the Court in Daubert, where it can shift the basis for the evaluation of
scientific evidence away from peer review and certainty and towards the
underlying validity of the scientific process.
Under the Frye test, federal courts assessed the admissibility of
testimony from scientific experts by deferring to the opinions of scientists
in the particular field.164 If most scientists in the expert’s field “generally
accepted” the validity of the expert’s methodology, the testimony was
154 See OMB Peer Review, supra note 76.
155 See Black, supra note 113, at 2130.
156 See Policy Decisions, supra note 50.
157 See, e.g., Thomas McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is June
Science, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 898–900 (2004); Sheila Jasanoff, Science, Politics, and the
Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA, OSIRIS 1992 [hereinafter Jasanoff, Science, Politics].
158 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594–95.
159 See Appendix A, supra note 112.
160 The procedures for evaluating the use of unpublished or non-peer-reviewed scientific re-
search in IPCC Reports are outlined in Annex 2 of Appendix A to the Principles Governing
IPCC Work. See id.
161 Id.
162 See OMB Peer Review, supra note 76, at app. A, par 4(2)(3).
163 See id.
164 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 579 (1993).
2012] RELIABLE SCIENCE 243
deemed admissible.165 By contrast, if the expert testimony was based on
methods not “generally accepted” in the relevant scientific community, the
courts excluded the testimony.166 In People v. Williams,167 the court con-
cluded that selection of the relevant scientific community appears to influ-
ence the result.168 There is no standard defining “relevant field.” Courts
have construed this parameter broadly and narrowly.169 The more nar-
rowly a court defined the pertinent field, the more agreement it was likely
to find.170 As a result, the “general acceptance” analysis often degenerated
into a process of deciding whose noses to count,171 especially in circum-
stances extending across more than one discipline.172 A similar issue arose
when courts considered how many scientists were needed to establish or
destroy a “consensus.”173 As a result, the Frye inquiry merely forced the
courts to accept whatever scientists believe.
165 See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 793–94 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that “[t]he
Frye court assumed that general acceptance indicated reliability and that only reliable
evidence should be admissible. The majority of jurisdictions that have faced similar issues
have adopted the Frye test, and to this day, it remains the majority rule.”).
166 See id. at 794.
167 People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251, 253–54 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
168 See id. at 253–54. The Court admitted a technique that was “generally accepted by those
who would be expected to be familiar with its use” even though “it cannot truthfully be said
that the . . . test has met with general acceptance by the medical profession as a whole.” Id.
169 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (Mass. 1975) (Frye test is met
when the technique is “generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar
with its use.”). See Giannelli, supra note 127.
170 See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that “[s]election
of the ‘relevant scientific community,’ appears to influence the result”).
171 See United States. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting a version of the
Frye test that hinged on “nose-counting.”).
The reliability inquiry that we envision is flexible and may turn on a
number of considerations, in contrast to the process of scientific “nose-
counting” that would appear to be compelled by a careful reading of Frye.
Unlike the Frye standard, the reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identification of a relevant scientific com-
munity and an express determination of a particular degree of acceptance
within that community. The district court in assessing reliability may
examine a variety of factors in addition to scientific acceptance.
Id. at 1238.
172 See State v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448 (Ohio 1983) (rejecting Frye because there is
no wisdom “in scientific nose-counting for the purpose of deciding whether evidence based
on newly ascertained or applied scientific principles is admissible.”).
173 See Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (Md. 1978) (stating that “[t]he purpose of the Frye
test is defeated by an approach which allows a court to ignore the informed opinions of
a substantial segment of the scientific community which stands in opposition to the process
in question”).
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Like Frye’s “general acceptance” standard, the IPCC’s assessment
process relies on peer review for assessing the reliability of experimental
methodologies and empirical observations.174 Again, the purpose of the pro-
cess is to regulate the quality of science to be used in the regulatory area.
As values are in dispute, stakes are high, and decisions are urgent, the use
of scientific consensus-based standards for evaluating the reliability of
the science in the regulatory area has created the same conundrum for
the IPCC that was faced by the Supreme Court in Daubert.
Peer review is a well-established concept widely practiced within
the scientific community. However, it takes different forms and uses
different procedures because the circumstances and the functions to be
performed are different.175 For instance, the peer-review practices at sci-
entific journals vary between journals.176 Similarly, funding agencies
follow different peer-review methods to review grant applications.177 Rec-
ognizing the need for flexibility in conducting peer review, the American
Bar Association’s official policy regarding the use of peer review in the
context of risk assessments by federal agencies provides: “[t]he nature,
significance, and complexity of the risk assessment should dictate when
peer review is used and the scope and nature of any peer review.”178
The IPCC’s assessments purport to represent the “consensus” of the
scientific community.179 Critics of the IPCC have challenged this claim.180
The existence of a “consensus” depends on how the relevant scientific com-
munity is defined, which can be construed broadly or narrowly. In the
latter instance, William Anderegg defined “consensus” narrowly by limit-
ing the relevant community of scientists to those actively publishing in
the field.181 By contrast, critics of the IPCC have construed the community
174 See Appendix A, supra note 112, at Annex 2.
175 See BRUCE ALBERTS, OMB PEER REVIEW COMMENTS FROM NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (2003), available at http://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/2003iq
/115.pdf.
176 See id.
177 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-99-99, PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT
FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY (1999).
178 Ronald A. Cass, Resolution on Risk Assessment, A.B.A. SEC. ADMIN. & REG. PRAC. (1999).
179 See Appendix A, supra note 112.
180 Idso & Singer, supra note 2.
181 See William R. L. Anderegg et al., Expert Credibility in Climate Change, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. (2010), available at http://www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas
.1003187107. Anderegg identified 908 climate scientists who had published at least twenty
papers on climate. Id. at 1. These scientists then classified those researchers as convinced
or unconvinced by the evidence for human-induced climate change. Id. at 2.
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broadly, which tends to suggest that no such consensus exists.182 For ex-
ample, in 2007, Frederick Seitz, the former head of the National Academy
of Sciences, re-launched the Petition Project “to demonstrate that the claim
of ‘settled science’ and an overwhelming ‘consensus’ in favor of the hy-
pothesis of human-caused global warming and consequent climatological
damage is wrong. No such consensus or settled science exists.”183 The
Petition has been endorsed by 31,487 Americans with university degrees
in science—including 9,029 PhDs.184 The vast majority of those who en-
dorsed the Petition Project would not qualify as part of the relevant com-
munity as defined by Anderegg.185
In Daubert, the district court held that the expert testimony was
inadmissible under the “general acceptance test” because it had not es-
tablished a link between Benedictine and birth defects with a ninety-five
percent level of statistical significance, which is the threshold that epide-
miologists typically required to establish scientific proof of causation.186
The district court rejected the plaintiff’s expert testimony because it did
not satisfy a scientific standard of certainty, which was far more demanding
than the law’s “preponderance of the evidence” requirement.187 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision but primarily on the
rationale that the expert’s testimony had not been the subject of a peer-
reviewed publication.188 The court held that under Frye only peer-reviewed
publications were “generally accepted” by the scientific community—non-
peer-reviewed expert testimony was thus categorically inadmissible.189
182 Id.
183 See GLOBAL WARMING PETITION PROJECT, supra note 2.
184 Idso & Singer, supra note 2.
185 Anderegg et al., supra note 181.
186 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F.Supp. 570, 575–76 (S.D. Cal. 1989). See also
Brief of Professor Alvan R. Feinstein as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1993 WL 13006384, at *3–4.
187 Daubert, 727 F.Supp. at 575–76.
188 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
189 In Daubert, the Ninth Circuit held that certain expert testimony from scientists of un-
challenged qualifications was wholly inadmissible because the methods of research and
analysis employed by those scientists were not “generally accepted” by the “scientific com-
munity.” Id. at 1130–31. In Metabolife v. Wornick, the Ninth Circuit explained that “peer
review is the chief way of satisfying th[e] requirement” that expert testimony be based on
scientifically valid principles. 264 F.3d 832, 841 (9th Cir. 2001). In other words, the Frye
standard indulged a strong assumption that “when a study has been peer-reviewed, it has
presumptively been conducted in accordance with the dictates of scientific methodology.”
Brief of the Carnegie Comm’n on Sci., Tech., & Gov’t as Amicus Curiae Supporting Neither
Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102), 1992 WL
12006521, at *26.
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The application of the Frye standard to the facts in Daubert created
a specific problem that had to be solved. Legal standards of proof are sig-
nificantly less stringent than scientific standards of proof.190 By deferring
to the standards of the scientific community for assessing the admissibility
of expert testimony, Frye’s “general acceptance” standard risked excluding
probative expert testimony that met legal standards of proof.191 By reject-
ing both of the lower courts’ rationales for excluding the expert testimony,
the Supreme Court created the following conundrum: how can a screening
mechanism be created for science that holds scientists to the standards of
the scientific community but still achieves the objectives of litigation?192
The Supreme Court resolved this dilemma with a two-pronged
solution.193 First, the Daubert Court unequivocally rejected the idea that
190 See JASANOFF, supra note 115, at 80 (noting that legal tests of sufficiency typically
require lower degrees of certainty than scientific standards of proof).
191 The disparity between judicial and scientific standards of proof created what one com-
mentator has called the “certainty trap,” which refers to the constraints on using science
in the courtroom. See Black, supra note 113 (proposing that Daubert rejected Frye’s treat-
ment of peer review but avoided the “certainty trap” by focusing the admissibility question
on the validity of the methodology used to produce the expert testimony and unequivo-
cally rejecting the idea that science was about certainty and absolute truth).
192 As amicus briefs for Daubert put it:
[The Ninth Circuit] concluded that unless an expert scientific study
reflects the “consensus” of the pertinent field and has been published
in a peer-reviewed journal, then it is not “good science” and is per se
inadmissible in a federal court . . . . The Ninth Circuit relies on notions
of “general acceptance” and “consensus,” but these unelaborated formu-
lations beg more questions that they answer.
Brief for Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioners, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102). The brief also stated:
Amici challenge the Ninth Circuit’s premise that the only “good science”
is that which is “generally accepted” and published in peer-reviewed
journals, and reject the notion that scientific analysis and conclusions
that might diverge from what a court deems the published “consensus”
are so unreliable as to be wholly unworthy of consideration.
See also Oral Argument, Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (No. 92-102), available at http://www.oyez
.org/cases/1990-1999/1992/1992_92_102.
193 In Daubert, Justice Blackmun explained that the judge’s task under Rule 702 was
screening out testimony that did not deserve to be called “scientific knowledge.” Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–90 (1993) (No. 92-102). Justice Blackmun de-
fined “scientific knowledge” in terms of the process used to produce it. Id. at 594. Daubert
abandoned the notion that research requires an absolute threshold level of certainty that
must be surmounted for an idea to become scientific. Quoting an amicus brief, Justice
Blackmun also recognized that the scientific process did not yield theories that are “immu-
tably true.” Id. at 590 (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Nicolaas Bloembergen et al. in Support
of Respondents, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (No. 92-102),
1993 WL 13006386, at *9).
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science is solely about certainty or truth.194 By doing so, the Court rede-
fined what it legally meant for courts to hold scientific experts to the
standards of the scientific community.195 There was no longer an absolute
level of certainty that had to be surmounted for an idea to be scientifi-
cally acceptable. Instead, the Court found that different kinds of decisions
required different levels of certainty.196
Second, the Court instructed trial courts to consider specific crite-
ria to evaluate the admissibility of expert evidence.197 It brought the criteria
of science into the courtroom and asked judges to evaluate whether expert
testimony met those criteria, and therefore satisfied the standards of the
scientific community.198 The question to be analyzed became whether the
scientists could validly reach conclusions at the level of certainty the law
requires, not the level of certainty the scientific community requires.199
As a result, science in the courtroom serves the objectives of the judicial
process but has the same level of reliability and certainty in the courtroom
as it does anywhere else.
The IPCC’s procedures are not scientifically flawed, but rather lack
the flexibility needed to raise or lower the thresholds needed to establish
reliability and relevance as the circumstances require. The IPCC needs a
more robust and diverse portfolio of strategies to ensure that the science
is credible. By using the standard for “research science,” to assess the qual-
ity of science to be used in the regulatory area, the IPCC is using a stan-
dard that is too stringent and rigid for its purposes. The objective should
194 See Oral Argument, supra note 192, at 18:23 (statement of Michael Gottesman, Esq.)
(“The issue here is not whether the plaintiffs can prove this scientific proposition to the
degree of certainty that would make it like the law of gravity [but] whether the plaintiffs
can demonstrate that it is likelier or not that this is causing that.”).
195 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593–94. Daubert resoundingly rejected this view of peer review
as a presumptive proxy for reliability. Id. Daubert’s discussion of “peer review and pub-
lication” takes pains to emphasize that publication in a peer-reviewed journal is no assur-
ance of soundness of a finding, and the lack of publication is no assurance that a study
and its findings are not sound. Id. The primary benefit of peer review and publication is
the likelihood that the scrutiny involved will identify substantive flaws in methodology.
Id. at 593. The Daubert Court thus concluded that publication in a peer-reviewed journal
“is not a sine qua non of admissibility” and “does not necessarily correlate with reliability.”
Id. Instead, the Court concluded that the “fact of publication (or lack thereof) in a peer
reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assess-
ing the scientific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an opinion
is premised.” Id. at 594.
196 Id. at 597.
197 Id. at 592.
198 Id. at 592–93.
199 Id. at 597.
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not be “certainty,” but should depend on the context on which the science
is being used. For the same reasons that the Frye standard was replaced
by the Daubert guidelines, the IPCC would bolster the strength of its
findings by adopting more flexible standards and shifting its analysis
from scientific certainty to the validity of the process underlying the
scientific findings.
IV. A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR REVIEWING IPCC ASSESSMENTS
In order for the IPCC assessments to be useful, U.S. agencies must
be comfortable enough with the conclusions to incorporate them into the
rulemaking process.200 Under the IQA,201 federal agencies may only use
information supplied by a third party as the basis for factual determina-
tions if the information satisfies the requirements of the U.S. Office of
Management and Budget’s “Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer
Review” (“the Bulletin”).202 Because the Bulletin applies to information
supplied by a third party and used by agencies as the basis for factual de-
terminations, it includes the IPCC assessments.203 The Bulletin requires
agencies to conduct a review of “influential”204 scientific information to
ensure the information meets certain minimum reliability and quality
standards.205 While the Bulletin provides basic guidelines about what re-
view mechanisms and procedures agencies should consider in different
circumstances, it gives agencies considerable discretion over how they
review influential information provided by third parties.206
Although the IPCC could adjust its assessment procedures to con-
form with the requirements of U.S. administrative law, this does not fully
200 Jasanoff, Science, Politics, supra note 157, at 195.
201 See Information Quality Act, supra note 94.
202 Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664 (Jan. 14, 2005)
[hereinafter OMB Bulletin].
203 The OMB Bulletin defines “scientific assessment [as an] evaluation of a body of scien-
tific or technical knowledge[, which] typically synthesizes multiple factual inputs, data,
models, assumptions, and/or applies best professional judgment to bridge uncertainties
in the available information.” Id. at 2665.
204 Id. at 2667 (“[I]nfluential scientific information means scientific information the agency
reasonably can determine will have or does have a clear and substantial impact on im-
portant public policies or private sector decisions”).
205 Id. at 2675 (defining highly influential scientific information that “(i) [c]ould have a
potential impact of more than $500 million in any year, or (ii) is novel, controversial, or
precedent-setting or has significant interagency interest”).
206 Agencies may tailor the review process to the substance of the information product as
necessary to ensure both the “scientific integrity” and “process integrity” of the review.
Id. at 2668.
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address the problem, as Congress could expand, narrow or otherwise mod-
ify the requirements for using IPCC assessments in the domestic rulemak-
ing process. For this reason, this Article proposes instituting a domestic
agency that would bear primary responsibility for reconciling IPCC as-
sessments with the requirements of U.S. administrative law.
The Daubert screening process used to deconstruct the IPCC as-
sessment will allow agencies to assess whether information is “influential”
or exempt under the Bulletin.207 In addition, by “grading” the substance
of IPCC assessments, the proposed agency would facilitate compliance with
the IQA by allowing agencies to assess “individual versus panel review;
timing; scope of the review; selection of reviewers; disclosure and attribu-
tion; public participation; disposition of reviewer comments; and adequacy
of prior peer review.”208 Other factors likely to bear on the review proce-
dures include “the novelty and complexity of the science to be reviewed,
the relevance of the information to decision making, the extent of prior
peer reviews, and the expected benefits and costs of additional review.”209
A. The Agency Structure and Role
In 1972, Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment
(“OTA”) to provide Congressional members and committees with assess-
ments of the complex scientific and technical issues of the late 20th cen-
tury.210 The OTA was governed by a twelve-member board, which consisted
of six members of Congress from each party divided equally between the
Senate and the House of Representatives.211 All told, the OTA produced
about 750 studies on a wide range of topics, including acid rain, climate
change and polygraphs.212 During the Reagan administration, the OTA
attracted criticism as an “unnecessary agency” that duplicated the work of
other government agencies.213 These criticisms culminated in the deci-
sions to defund the OTA in 1995.214 Although the OTA was defunded, it
207 OMB Bulletin, supra note 203.
208 Id. at 2668.
209 Id. at 2671.
210 See Office of Tech. Assessment Act, Pub. L. No. 92-484, 86 Stat. 797 (1972).
211 See id.
212 Jon Peha, Science and Technology Advice for Congress: Past, Present, and Future (Dep’t
of Engineering and Pub. Pol’y, Paper No. 55, 2006), available at http://repository.cmu
.edu/epp/55/.
213 See Laura H. Kahn, Bring Back the Office of Technology Assessment, BULLETIN OF
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (May 20, 2007), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists
/laura-h-kahn/bring-back-the-office-of-technology-assessment.
214 Peha, supra note 212, at 3–4.
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was never de-authorized.215 This paper proposes re-instituting the OTA
for the purpose of enhancing the domestic legitimacy and credibility of
the IPCC’s climate change assessments.216
The proposed agency would be responsible for evaluating the va-
lidity of the methodologies underlying IPCC assessments. This would be
a two-part process analogous to the way trial judges review the admissi-
bility of expert testimony under Daubert. The process would establish a
record containing sufficient scientific information and analysis to support
these recommendations, which could be used by agencies to support policy,
and could ultimately be reviewed by the courts under the “substantial
evidence” or “arbitrary and capricious” tests for judicial review of admin-
istrative action.217
The threshold step involves the agency’s determination of what the
claims are within the IPCC assessment that need to be validated. Each as-
sessment contains about 100 findings.218 Each of those findings involves
differing levels of complexity, dimensionality and spatial resolution.219
Depending on the complexity of the finding, the agency would make an
initial determination of whether to apply the Daubert criteria according to
an “atomized” or “corpuscular”220 standard, or a “weight-of-the-evidence”
standard.221 In the litigation context, under the “corpuscular standard,”
the party offering expert testimony must demonstrate that each individual
215 See Hearing on 2011 Appropriations Before the Subcomm. on Legislative Branch of the
H. Comm. on Appropriations, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Francesca T. Grifo, Senior
Scientist, Union of Concerned Scientists Scientific Integrity Program).
216 Many others have similarly suggested re-funding the OTA. In April 2010, the Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars published Reinventing Technology Assessment,
which called for establishing a nationwide network of non-partisan policy research orga-
nizations for performing the functions of the OTA that emphasized citizen engagement—
the Expert & Citizen Assessment of Science & Technology (ECAST) network. RICHARD
SCLOVE, WOODROW WILSON INT’L CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, REINVENTING TECHNOLOGY
ASSESSMENT ix (2010).
217 See CARL F. CRANOR, REGULATING TOXIC SUBSTANCES: A PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND
THE LAW 147 (1993).
218 See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007).
219 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 943 (Susan Soloman et al. eds. 2007).
220 See COMMITTEE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE THIRD EDITION OF THE REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 19, 21
(3d ed. 2011) [hereinafter REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE].
221 See, e.g., Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 18–20, 23 (1st
Cir. 2011) (finding that the “weight of the evidence” as a whole could properly support an
expert’s opinion).
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study upon which the expert relies as well as the expert’s overall conclu-
sions satisfy the Daubert criteria.222 The plaintiff must meet the burden
of “‘validating’ each of the studies relied upon by the plaintiff’s experts
as well as [the burden of establishing] the scientific reliability of their
overall conclusions.”223 By contrast, “[t]he weight-of-the-evidence approach
focuses upon the totality of the scientific information” and whether a spe-
cific conclusion seems warranted.224 In the same way that the court must
decide which of these approaches to take, the agency would have to make
that determination as well depending on the complexity of the climate
system model.
Once the various claims have been identified and organized, the
proposed agency would apply the Daubert criteria to those claims by
evaluating whether each of the IPCC’s conclusions was supported by the
underlying texts and scientific references.225 The analysis would focus on
assessing statements by identifying errors and inaccuracies—both in
claims and corroboration. The evaluation would assess whether state-
ments that attribute impacts to climate change are well founded in scien-
tific research, including systematic observations, modeling and statistics.
Any expert judgments that are incorporated in summaries would be made
transparent and plausible by explaining the line of reasoning behind them
in the main text. The agency would ensure observations and interpretations
had been captured conscientiously, statements had been substantiated
and the influence of any expert judgments had been made transparent.
This process has many advantages. First, it allows agencies to use
the IPCC assessments in a more tailored and efficient manner. Second, it
provides user-friendly materials that are salient and understandable not
only to the agencies, but also to the public. Since it is impossible for most
readers of IPCC reports to understand and check every reference, all data,
models, calculations and measurements, they must be able to rely on the
quality control and quality assurances given by the assessment process.
222 See Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific
Evidence, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 55, 57, 69 (1998) (noting that the courts have frequently read
Daubert to require them to evaluate each study underlying an expert’s conclusion se-
quentially to determine admissibility).
223 Id.
224 Id. at 23.
225 See NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, ASSESSING AN IPCC ASSESSMENT 5 (2010) (The
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency is “an independent governmental body
that by statute provides the Dutch Government and Parliament—and the European
Commission, European Parliament and U.N. organizations—with scientific advice on
problems regarding the environment, sustainability and spatial planning.”).
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B. Applying the Framework to a Climate Change Model
A key IPCC finding that would benefit from this new framework
is the claim that average global surface temperatures have risen over the
past half century.226 In the AR4, the IPCC claims that “[w]arming of the
climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of in-
creases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting
of snow and ice and rising global average sea level.”227 More specifically,
the IPCC concludes that the mean global-surface temperature (both land
and oceans) increased by about 0.64°C annually from 1956 to 2005.228
The historical changes in average global surface temperatures,
which we will refer to simply as “global temperature trends,” have been
described as the “most important indicator of global warming, by far.”229
The basis for the IPCC’s finding can be traced to three institutional ef-
forts to reconstruct average global surface temperature histories for the
purposes of studying climate change.230 These analyses were produced by
three institutions: the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Goddard Institute for Space Studies (“NASA”), the U.S. National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (“NOAA”), and a collaboration of the
Hadley Centre of the U.K. Meteorological Office with the Climate Research
Unit of East Anglia (“CRU”).231 These groups have developed separate
frameworks for reconstructing global temperature trends based on similar
226 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS
REPORT (2007).
227 Id. at 30.
228 Kevin Trenberth et al., Observations: Surface and Atmospheric Climate Change, in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 249 (Susan Solomon et al. eds. 2007) . The annual average increase in global
surface temperatures has a margin of error of about 0.13°C. Id.
229 A New Assessment of Global Warming, BERKELEY EARTH SURFACE TEMPERATURE,
http://berkeleyearth.org/study/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). See also ROBERT ROHDE ET AL.,
BERKELEY EARTH TEMPERATURE AVERAGING PROCESS 1 (2011), available at http://berkeley
earth.org/pdf/berkeley-earth-averaging-process.pdf (“While there are many indicators of
climate change, the long-term evolution of global surface temperatures is perhaps the met-
ric that is both the easiest to understand and most closely linked to the quantitative pre-
dictions of climate models. It is also backed by the largest collection of raw data.”); Richard
A. Muller, The Case Against Global-Warming Skepticism, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Oct. 21,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204422404576594872796327348.html.
230 See ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229, at 3.
231 Id. These groups have developed their respective analysis frameworks, which share
many features, over the past twenty-five years. Id.
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but not identical weather records.232 In all three cases, the reconstruction
frameworks follow a basic three-part process, which includes: (1) the com-
pilation of a basic dataset, (2) the application of a processing framework
for adjusting or correcting erroneous, biased, and questionable data, and
(3) a process by which the resulting data is mapped and averaged to pro-
duce useful climate indices.233
With respect to the compilation of data, all three groups recon-
struct global temperature trends based on measurements gathered from
land-based weather stations and ocean-borne weather monitors on ships
and buoys and cover roughly 1850 to present.234
CRU, NASA, and NOAA cull through these measurements in a
process commonly called “homogenization” designed to “correct” distor-
tions resulting from changes in instrumentation, station location, mea-
surement procedures, local vegetation or other factors that can introduce
artificial biases in a temperature record.235 The “homogenized” data are
stored in the Global Historical Climatology Network’s (“GHCN”) archive,236
which includes separate databases for daily and monthly temperature
measurements that draw on different data sources and involve different
quality control and bias correction procedures.237 In the case of land-
based temperatures,238 all three global averages rely at least partially on
the GHCN to reconstruct global-average temperatures in the past and
estimate how they may change in the future.239
232 Id. at 4. The three groups use heavily overlapping data sets consisting of temperature
records from between 4400 and 7500 monitoring stations. The selection of stations is in-
fluenced by algorithms that require long, nearly continuous records. Id.
233 Id.
234 ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229, at 3.
235 See NOAA, SUMMARY OF RECENT CHANGES IN THE GHCN-M TEMPERATURE DATASET
AND MERGED LAND-OCEAN SURFACE TEMPERATURE ANALYSIS 2 (2011).
236 The GHCN website is available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ghcnm/.
237 See Global Historical Climatology Network—Daily, NOAA SATELLITE AND INFOR-
MATION SERVICE, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/ghcn-daily/index.php (last visited
Oct. 30, 2012).
238 The land-based and ocean-surface time series are essentially independent. See ROHDE
ET AL., supra note 229, at 3 (“Two of the three groups [NASA and CRU] treat the land-based
and ocean problems as essentially independent reconstructions with global results only
formed after constructing separate land and ocean time series.”).
239 See Ross McKitrick, A Critical Review of Global Surface Temperature Data Products 4
(Social Science Research Network, Working Paper 1653928, 2010) (“CRU and [NASA]
supplement it with a small amount of additional data. . . . CRU has stated that about 98
percent of its input data are from GHCN. [NASA] also relies on GHCN with some addi-
tional US data from the USHCN network, and some additional Antarctic data sources.
NOAA relies entirely on the GHCN network.”).
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Given the common reliance on GHCN, critics have claimed that
any flaws in the GHCN’s data would potentially flow through to all three
global temperature histories.240 In particular, critics have expressed con-
cerns that the quality assurance mechanisms, bias corrections, and other
processing steps used to adjust the raw data are ineffective.241 The three
groups address temporal and spatial gaps in the data in different ways.242
Thus, critics have challenged the reliability of land and sea-surface data
used to create long-term warming trends as a result of various potential
processing errors and sampling biases.243
1. Step One—Construing the Claim
To assess the reliability of the IPCC’s claim that temperatures
have risen by an estimated annual average of 0.64°C from 1956 to 2005,
the proposed agency would first construe the claim that needs to be val-
idated. This claim construction would determine the degree to which the
agency “atomized” the evidence supporting the IPCC’s claim for purposes
of vetting the claim’s reliability in the following step. The atomization
analysis would reflect the complexity of the claim and novelty of the
evidence supporting it, and would serve as a platform for performing the
Daubert-like screening in the second step of the process.
The evidence supporting the IPCC’s finding—the three major global
temperature trend reconstructions—is more complex than one would likely
suspect.244 The complexity results from the sheer scale of data involved245
and, perhaps more importantly, the pervasive reliability problems possib-
ly affecting a very large portion of that data.246 The key word is “possibly.”
Ross McKitrick has explained these reliability problems in the
GHCN archives by contrasting actual temperature records with the ideal
240 Id. (“Because of this [common] reliance on GHCN, its quality deficiencies will constrain
the quality of all derived products.”).
241 See id. at 17, 28, 33–34, 44–45.
242 Juliet Lapidos, How Important Is the East Anglia Climate Data Set?, SLATE (Dec. 2,
2009), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2009/12/how_important
_is_the_east_anglia_climate_data_set.html (noting that in order to address the lack of
permanent weather stations in the Arctic Ocean, “NASA’s approach is to extrapolate tem-
peratures from the nearest land-based stations,” while the “CRU doesn’t ‘fill in’ the [missing
measurements from the] Arctic Ocean . . . which makes it seem as though the Arctic is
warming at the same rate as the global mean.”).
243 See Muller, supra note 229.
244 See ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229, at 3; NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, supra note
225, at 5.
245 See NETH. ENVTL. ASSESSMENT AGENCY, supra note 225, at 5.
246 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
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record of surface temperatures.247 The ideal record for land-based tem-
peratures would be collected continuously at consistent intervals at a
monitoring site unaffected by changes in the surrounding environment
(e.g., urbanization) using the same, perfectly maintained equipment.248
Temperature measurements gathered at such an ideal monitoring site
over a given time period would yield an unambiguously reliable history
of temperature trends during that time period. Of course, the real world
is anything but ideal and the GHCN archive is by no means an exception.
Temperatures at land-based observational sites can be affected by local
land-use changes in the area surrounding the monitoring site—defores-
tation, road-building and urbanization.249 Imagine a hypothetical weather
station where minimum, maximum, and mean temperatures were recorded
every day for fifty years using the same equipment and measurement pro-
cedures. If the weather station was surrounded by raw forests for the first
half of that time period and industrial-scale manufacturing facilities for
the second half of that time period, it would be reasonable to expect tem-
perature records to overestimate temperature increases during the latter
half of the time period.
But land-use changes are not the only sources of bad thermometer
readings possibly distorting the GHCN archive. The sources of possible
distortion abound. A few of the better known examples include equipment
and procedural discontinuities, changes in local air pollution, temporal
gaps and so forth.250
Ross McKitrick has documented the deficiencies in the GHCN data
and suggested that these deficiencies diminish the reliability of the three
climatic histories used by the IPCC to support various policy recommen-
dations.251 In particular, McKitrick concludes that “there are serious qual-
ity problems in [the GHCN] that call into question whether the global
temperature history, especially over land, can be considered both contin-
uous and precise.”252
Recent research has called into question the reliability of the
temperature data.253 In particular, Anthony Watts classified 82.5 percent
247 See McKitrick, supra note 239, at 34.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id. at 18.
252 See McKitrick, supra note 239, at 4.
253 See, e.g., Anthony Watts, Is the U.S. Surface Temperature Record Reliable, THE
HEARTLAND INSTITUTE (2009); Roger Pielke et al., Unresolved Issues with the Assessment
of Multi-Decadal Global Land Surface Temperature Trends, 112 J. GEOPHYS. RES. D24S08
(2007), available at http://www.agu.org/journals/jd/jd0724/2006JD008229/2006JD008229.pdf.
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of the 1218 weather stations included in the U.S. Historical Climatol-
ogy Network (“USHCN”) according to a reliability grading schematic254
adopted by the NOAA in 2002.255 The schematic assigns individual sta-
tions a reliability grade ranging from the most reliable (Class 1) to the
least reliable (Class 5).256 The survey shows that seventy percent of the
USHCN temperature stations are ranked in the least reliable categories
of four or five, which have a margin of error of 2°C to 5°C, respectively.257
The scale of this potential inaccuracy is significantly larger compared to
the IPCC estimates of annual warming trends, which estimate that global
average temperatures have risen by 0.64°C ± 0.13°C every year from 1956
to 2005.258 The analysis found that temperature biases are largest for
stations with the worst siting characteristics.259 As a result, the study con-
cluded that poor siting suggested that global-average temperature re-
construction had overestimated warming trends.260
This research suggests that the potential rate of error in the
unadjusted GHCN data is very high. To address these reliability con-
cerns, the global-temperature histories that support the IPCC’s finding261
on recent global warming trends rely on various statistical techniques
to adjust the temperature records for problems.262 The reliability of the
254 The reliability schematic was developed in 1999. See M. Leroy, Classification d’un Site,
Note Technique no. 35, Direction des Systèmes d’Observation, MÉTÉO-FRANCE, 12pp. (1999).
255 See NOAA, SITE INFORMATION HANDBOOK 6–7 (2002). The classification system eval-
uates accuracy in four categories: temperature/humidity, precipitation, solar radiation, and
wind. Id.
256 See Souleymane Fall et al., Analysis of the Impacts of the Station Exposure on the U.S.
Historical Climatology Network Temperatures and Temperature Trends, 116. J. GEOPHYS.
D141120 (2011).
257 Id.
258 RHODE ET AL., supra note 229, at 3 (citing Trenberth et al., supra note 228 (2007)).
259 Souleymane Fall et al. supra note 256, at 2.
260 Id. at 13.
261 The IPCC has addressed the problem of surface-data contamination and adjustment
mechanisms in all of its Assessment Reports. In AR4, the IPCC takes up the issue in
Chapter 3 of Working Group I’s report, which states:
Systematic instrumental errors, such as changes in measurement prac-
tices or urbanization, could be more important, especially earlier in the
record, although these errors are calculated to be relatively small at
large spatial scales. Urbani[z]ation effects appear to have negligible ef-
fects on continental and hemispheric average temperatures . . . .
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change 243 (S. Solomon et al. eds., 2007) (citing P. Brohan et al.,
Uncertainty Estimates in Regional and Global Observed Temperature Changes: A New
Data Set from 1850, 111 J. GEOPHYS. RES. D12106 (2006)).
262 See Overview, NOAA, available at http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/ghcnm/v3.php.
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global-average temperature reconstructions depends on the validity of
these adjustments applied to the temperature records in the GHCN
archive.263 As a result, the “quality control” measures used to correct or
adjust the temperature measurements are critical for the accuracy of
global average temperature reconstructions.
Under the framework for evaluating the IPCC’s assessment re-
ports described above, the evidence of high potential rates of error in the
unadjusted data would likely persuade the proposed agency to adopt a
corpuscular or atomized approach to evaluating the reliability of the
IPCC’s finding that global average temperatures have increased annu-
ally by about 0.63°C from 1956 to 2005. The existing groups construct a
global average surface temperature record based on the “adjusted” time
series.264 More specifically, the agency would likely construe all three ad-
justment frameworks used to reconstruct global average temperature
trends as separate claims—or “methodologies”—to be validated indepen-
dently. The argument for atomizing these adjustment frameworks would
likely be enhanced given that a critical rationale for endorsing these re-
constructions regardless of concerns raised about the reliability of their
adjustments265 is that they arrive at the same results. Because each recon-
struction framework applies different adjustment mechanisms to the
GHCN data, the fact that they arrive at nearly identical conclusions sug-
gests that their adjustments are reliable.266
2. Step Two—Applying Daubert
In the second part of the proposed framework, the agency would
assess the reliability of the quality-control adjustments applied to the
GHCN data based on factors similar to those described in Daubert.267
This section of the paper focuses on the extent to which the methods used
to adjust the GHCN data had been “tested.”268 This is not to suggest that
263 McKitrick, supra note 239, at 4.
264 RHODE ET. AL., supra note 229, at 3.
265 McKitrick, supra note 239, at 30.
266 The EPA emphasized this rationale when it cited the IPCC in support of its Endanger-
ment Finding. See, e.g., PEABODY ENERGY, PETITION FOR CORRECTION OF EPA’S ENDAN-
GERMENT FINDING IX-6–IX-18 (Dec. 2009) (noting “[T]here are significant data problems
with GHCN, and these problems are of sufficient magnitude as to invalidate claims to
have identified trends in the three temperature records with . . . precision.”).
267 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993).
268 The paper does not consider the peer-review prong of the Daubert test or whether the
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community. See Daniel Farber, Modeling
Climate Change and Its Impacts: Law, Policy, and Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1658
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this is the only, or even the most important criterion to consider, but
rather to take advantage of recent research validating the adjustment
frameworks underlying the three reconstruction efforts supporting the
IPCC’s claim that the world has warmed over the past fifty years.269
The Berkeley Earth Surface Temperature (“BEST”) project,270
which began in 2010 under the leadership of Dr. Richard Muller and Dr.
Robert Rohde, merged existing land-surface temperature records from
over 36,000 weather stations into a comprehensive raw data set.271 The
BEST project reviewed “existing temperature processing algorithms for
averaging, homogenization, and error analysis to understand both their
advantages and their limitations.”272 Based on the limitations of extant
adjustment methodologies, the BEST project created a new global surface
temperature record based on “alternative statistical methods.”273
In all three global average land-surface temperature reconstruc-
tions, every temperature measurement used to determine the global av-
erage land-surface temperature record is assumed to be equally reliable.274
As a result, heavily adjusted temperature measurements are deemed to
be as reliable as temperature measurements where no bias adjustments
were found to be necessary.275 This uniform treatment of adjusted and un-
adjusted data has diminished the accuracy of the resulting global aver-
age land-surface temperature reconstructions.
To evaluate the claim that flawed quality-control measures were
producing erroneous reconstructions of global-average temperatures, the
BEST project weighted temperature records from 1800 to present in the
GHCN land-temperature dataset for reliability.276 This weighted data
was used to reconstruct global average land-surface temperatures using
only the non-homogenized, non-adjusted GHCN data.277 The weighting
(arguing that climate scientists have created “a unique institutional system for assessing
and improving models, going well beyond the usual system of peer review . . . [and so]
their conclusions should be entitled to considerable credence by courts and agencies”).
269 See, e.g., KARL POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its fal-
sifiabilty, or refutability, or testability”) (emphasis omitted).
270 See ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229; Frequently Asked Questions, BERKELEY EARTH
SURFACE TEMPERATURE, http://berkeleyearth.org/faq/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
271 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 270.
272 DAVID BRILLINGER ET AL., BERKELEY EARTH SURFACE TEMPERATURE ANALYSIS 1 (2011),
available at http://berkeleyearth.org/pdf/berkeley-earth-summary.pdf.
273 Id.
274 See ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229, at 6.
275 Id. at 2.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 6.
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framework was designed to ensure that temperature records considered
more likely to be biased or distorted as a result of changing land-use pat-
terns or other well-recognized distortions had less influence on the recon-
structed climatic history.278 In other words, the BEST methodology allowed
data with varying levels of quality to be used without compromising the
accuracy of the resulting reconstructions.
The resulting reconstruction showed that the global land mean
temperature had increased by 0.911°C ± 0.042°C since the 1950s, which
is significantly higher than the rate of warming claimed by the IPCC in
AR4 but with a smaller margin of error.279
What about poor station quality? Again, our statistical
methods allowed us to analyze the U.S. temperature record
separately for stations with good or acceptable rankings,
and those with poor rankings (the U.S. is the only place in
the world that ranks its temperature stations). Remark-
ably, the poorly ranked stations showed no greater temp-
erature increases than the better ones. The mostly likely
explanation is that while low-quality stations may give in-
correct absolute temperatures, they still accurately track
temperature changes . . . . Our results turned out to be
close to those published by prior groups. We think that
means that those groups had truly been very careful in
their work, despite their inability to convince some skeptics
of that. They managed to avoid bias in their data selection,
homogenization and other corrections.280
By developing an alternative methodology for reconstructing glob-
al average temperatures that relied directly on the unadjusted data, the
BEST project validated the effectiveness of the averaging process and
quality-assurance controls281 applied by previous global average temper-
ature reconstructions.282
278 Id.
279 See ROHDE ET AL., supra note 229, at 6.
280 Muller, The Case Against Global Warming Skepticism, supra note 229.
281 See Richard Muller et al., Earth Atmospheric Land Surface Temperature and Station
Quality in the United States at 9 (2011) (“Although our analysis was done using only US
land stations, it indicates that the poor station quality documented by Fall et al. . . .
should not significantly bias estimates of global warming”). For additional discussion of
the Fall research, see supra note 256 and accompanying text.
282 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (“Ordinarily, a key question
to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that
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Science recognizes that it is impossible to prove the absolute truth
of any hypothesis or model. The most well-established physical laws are
“conditional.” Rather, the doctrine of falsifiability developed by the phi-
losopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, and adopted by the Supreme Court
in Daubert, stands for the proposition that the more independent chal-
lenges that a theory or model passes successfully, the more confidence
one can have in it.283
CONCLUSION
The debate about climate change science is unlike any other sci-
entific controversy in recent memory. Not only does the public disagree,
but highly esteemed scientists (and political leaders who largely parrot
those scientists) champion conflicting certainties about climate change
with enormous levels of confidence. On one hand, many scientists claim
that the evidence of global warming is virtually “incontrovertible.” On
the other hand, a non-negligible number of scientists claim the same
evidence is wildly inconclusive.
Still more stunning is that decades of intense research have at
most, modestly narrowed the gulf of understanding between those who
say the science is settled and those who say it is anything but settled.
Indeed, a series of recent surveys and studies have strongly suggested
that the disagreement over climate change science has hardened over the
past decade and especially in the past two or three years. The lack of con-
vergence around a prevailing interpretation of the scientific evidence of
climate change has prompted many scientists to consider whether changes
in the structure of scientific activity over the past half century are driving
the climate change science controversy. Leading scientists from both sides
of the climate change controversy have concluded that the answer is re-
soundingly “yes.”
In a forthcoming paper, one of the most highly regarded scientific
critics of climate change science concludes that “progress in climate sci-
ence and the actual solution of scientific problems in this field have moved
at a much slower rate than would normally be possible” as the result of
changes in the underlying structure of scientific activity over the past
will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has been) tested.”). See also POPPER,
supra note 269, at 37 (“[T]he criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability,
or refutability, or testability”).
283 POPPER, supra note 269, at 35 (“[O]ur belief in any particular natural law cannot have
a safer basis than our unsuccessful critical attempts to refute it.”).
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half century.284 A growing number of climate scientists who have sup-
ported the IPCC assessments in various forms have similarly recognized
that concerns about the validity of the methodologies used by climate
change science has exacerbated the controversy over climate change
science. In other words, climate change skeptics are posing “a challenge
to the process of climate change science, or to the values they believe
to be implicit in the science, rather than as a direct challenge to scien-
tific knowledge.”285
This paper has argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical was driven by the same “changes
in the structure of scientific activity over the past half century.” In par-
ticular, the issues implicated by litigation-driven science are sufficiently
similar to those implicated by policy-driven science. The Daubert experi-
ence provides a potential model for enhancing the credibility and legitimacy
of climate change science.
284 See Richard Lindzen, Climate Science: Is It Currently Designed to Answer Questions?,
EURISIS, 161, 180–181 (2012).
285 Mike Hulme, The Appliance of Science, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 13, http://www.guardian
.co.uk/society/2007/mar/14/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange.
